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discussion is particularly relevant in view of the fact that it is the
federations, namely Germany and Italy, within the Communities that
have caused the greatest difficulty. These essays are not necessarily easy
reading, but they are certainly stimulating.
DENNIS THOMPSON *
MODERN CAPITALISm: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE POWER. By Andrew Shonfield.' London: Oxford University
Press. 1965. Pp. xvi, 456. $10.50.
What has converted capitalism from "old-fashioned" to "modem" -
or, what is the same thing to Mr. Shonfield, from "cataclysmic failure"
in the thirties to an "engine of prosperity" in the postwar world (p. 3)
-is the nature of the changes which have taken place in the economic
management of Western societies. Shifting economic management's
control centers from private hands to public hands has not only over-
hauled the economic engine, giving it more and steadier power and
greater, more constant acceleration; it has improved driving habits,
sharpened the vision of the drivers, coordinated the trip plans of travel-
ers, eliminated the need for stop and go lights, and created substantial
savings in fuel costs. But this is not all. It has done even more; it has
taken travelers to "better" destinations than they could have chosen
for themselves.
The changes in economic management which are chosen for special
commendation have to do with direct controls -controls which over-
ride or supplant market decisions. In fact, the market is the culprit for
the sins of the old capitalism. A market is either the chaos of wasteful
competition or, more characteristically for Mr. Shonfield, a center of
coercive private power. Public controls which are market-supporting
rather than market-supplanting, controls which are exemplified by the
central direction or supervision of monetary or fiscal policy, are not the
public controls to which the author credits the postwar successes of
Modem Capitalism. Success, rather, derives from a central planner's
blueprint of when to make what for whom - especially through invest-
ment decisions. Principal focus is on growth, continuous, nonfluctuating,
socially desirable growth in general but growth which is mainly provided
through private investment which is directed and controlled by the
public planners. Solving economic problems through a price system is
not the essence of capitalism to Andrew Shonfield.
The method by which Shonfield attempts to establish that central
planning is the engine of prosperity in the new capitalism is perhaps
best described as proof by association. He discerns a positive correlation
between the existence of some kind of a central planning mechanism and
high and steady growth rates among Western nations in the nineteen
fifties and early sixties. There is no specific identification of growth
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goals nor any analytical evaluation of possible alternatives to centrally
directed resource allocation. Neither is there appraisal, theoretical or
otherwise, of appropriate preconditions necessary for a principled con-
clusion as to whether individual or collective decision-making is called
for. One is left with the distinct impression that there is little or no
danger of too much central planning or planning of the wrong things.
The signs are plainly marked and they point in the same direction along
Shonfield's Road to Growthdom.
An "Argument in Brief" for planning is presented in a short fourth
chapter. The unprecedented prosperity enjoyed by the advanced coun-
tries of the Western World during the 195o's and early i96o's is de-
scribed as having three major characteristics: (i) steady growth-
steadier than in previous periods, (2) rapid growth- more rapid than
in previous periods (except for America which retained a "recession
psychology"), and (3) diffused benefits-social benefits of prosperity
distributed more widely than ever before.
The distinctive features of this new era of capitalism are described
as supplementing and extending beyond the conscious pursuit of full
employment according to the "Keynesian guidebook." Much more dis-
tinctive than business cycle control is what was done by detailed plan-
ning after reasonably full employment was thought no longer to be a
principal cause for concern. The author lists (pp. 66-67) five outstand-
ing features which have emerged in postwar capitalism: widely varying
but vastly increased public authority; increased use of public funds for
social welfare; tamed violence in private markets; public direction of
research and of employee retraining; and new attitudes about co-
operation with planners by business management, especially in dominant
firms.
The continental nations have grown faster and more steadily than
either the United States or Great Britain in recent years, allegedly
because continental central planners directed growth patterns more and
better with less distraction from antiplanners or special interest groups.
Western nations are recognized to have large differences between key
institutions and economic methods, which are often the subject of
sharp ideological cleavages, but master planning by experts is seen as
the common denominator of successful Modern Capitalism. West
Germany, for example, represents "modern" rather than "old-fashioned"
capitalism because of the central direction provided by a few large bank-
ing houses working closely with industry representatives. In Sweden
Modern Capitalism is represented by nationwide worker groups negoti-
ating with similar employer groups. In Italy joint private-public
ownership of industry is stressed, with management a modern form of
the older corporate state of Mussolini's time. In France, on the other
hand, there is a Commissariat du Plan which represents a more formal-
ized planning power.
Stressing planned growth through directed investment, Mr. Shonfield
is distrustful both of consumer choices and of producer selfishness.
Producers are viewed as the source of private power which the public
planners need to balance. Seeing monopoly power almost everywhere,
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at least where production is most efficient, and despairing of the effective-
ness of market competition, the alternatives of government ownership
or government control loom before him as the principal alternatives for
the achievement of prosperity. Shonfield, as has been indicated, focuses
on the latter because he sees advantage from private enterprise when
adequately controlled and directed. Large business enterprises are use-
ful sources of productive efficiency.
Modern Capitalism succeeds where old-fashioned capitalism fails,
according to the author, because without central planning efficient co-
ordination of complementary activities cannot be achieved. He says,
for example (pp. 225-26), that:
[I]f responsible people were not prepared to predict future needs some
years ahead, certain kinds of investment would always be late- with
the result that the rate of growth of the economy as a whole would be
significantly slowed down. The port capacity needed to take extra ex-
ports and imports in a period of rapid economic growth would never be
ready on time; the road connecting with the port would always be
congested; factory order books would be over-full and deliveries would
be delayed. In the end it would be the customer who would find himself
compelled to plan ahead, anticipating his own needs in order to get them
met on time.
Ports and roads, it must be emphasized, are not for Mr. Shonfield
special cases calling for planning because they have unique characteris-
tics making them unsuitable candidates for the competitive process.
His central thesis, evidenced here by reference to factory orders being
misallocated because of congested roads and crowded ports, is that a
competitive system generally is incapable of responding as appropriately
to joint demand for complements as is a system which is coordinated by
a government authority. Thus coordination between two complementary
competitive segments (such as a bacon industry and a separate egg
industry) is as good an example of the problem Shonfield sees as is co-
ordination between public ore docks and the production of ore. "As a
whole" it is the competitive process which is the inefficient laggard in
Shonfield's view. If this is so, some counter-examples from American
experience need explaining. Can it be that automobile sales in America
are comparatively retarded because automobile production is not
centrally coordinated with road building, tire making, gasoline output,
and the distribution of road maps? And can it be contended with other
than mock seriousness that the competitive production of America's
electrical appliances, as compared to production of these products in
Europe, is to be explained by the presence here of government directives
apportioning appliance production to the output of electric power? If
Mr. Shonfield wants a good example of lack of coordination between
productive capacity and output, I suggest he will search far before he
finds a better one than that provided by the central planning (proration)
of America's crude oil resources.
Mr. Shonfield has great admiration for the French model of central
planning. He emphasizes the special usefulness of central control of in-
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vestment of the kind exercised by the Commissariat du Plan. Inter-
vention in crucial points in the capital market is urged so as to fashion
the pattern and the pace of investment. Treasury approval before in-
dustrial bonds may be issued, Commissariat approval before substantial
bank credits can be rediscounted by the central bank, and Commissariat
approval of long term bank loans are all cited (pp. 166-71), without
qualification, as means of making France richer at a faster and more even
pace.
Critics of central planning get short shrift. Shonfield says (p. 226) of
planning in general:
All that has to be shown in order to justify the effort of central planning
is that it makes it more probable than it would be under a pure market
system that complementary investments involving a long lead time will
be carried out when they are required. There are more and more such
investments in our rich and crowded societies. If foresight has any value
at all, a planned system will tend to work with a lower margin of under-
employed capacity in any given productive center. That is another way
of saying that it will suffer from fewer bottlenecks. And it also implies
that the capital-output ratio will be more favourable. This last is certainly
one of the outstanding features of postwar France; and the French
planners have, plausibly enough, claimed some of the credit for it.
And, in this reviewer's view at least, with little risk of blame for possible
mistakes! Commissariats are by their very nature insulated from the
kind of comparisons of alternatives which markets foster. If, for ex-
ample, an Edsel gets "planned," the advantage to the planner of being
in the government over being in the Ford Motor Company should be
apparent. On the other hand, as far as the consumer is concerned,
having bad planning undone is hardly the kind of advantage ascribable
to state planning.
In this reviewer's opinion Shonfield's case for central planning is
singularly unconvincing. The book is much more useful for its descrip-
tion than for its analysis. Since World War II there have been very
substantial increases in the output of goods and services produced under
widely differing degrees and kinds of centralized direction and super-
vision. Any country, Western or non-Western, developed or under-
developed, except those at the margin of bare subsistence, can, if it
chooses, cut back current consumption to buy or build the tools to get
more for tomorrow. Some governments, without apparent disadvantage,
leave this kind of choice to individual income receivers just as some
governments allow more freedom for individuals to choose what goods
they will consume- again without noticeable harm to prosperity.
The wide diffusion of prosperity, listed as one of the three major
characteristics of Modern Capitalism, bears no necessary causal con-
nection to central planning of the market-supplanting type. Any sys-
tem of income equalization must of course be concerned with preserving
the productive sources of the prosperity which is being reapportioned,
but income or wealth can be more efficiently redistributed by tax
measures than by arbitrary output rationing. Indeed, a system of
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diffusing prosperity by attempting "fairly" to ration each of the myriad
goods of an economy should surely qualify as highest in cost and lowest
in efficiency.
The two major characteristics of Modem Capitalism other than
diffusion of benefits, rate of growth and steadiness of growth, are, at
least on the surface, more plausibly related to central planning. But
assessing growth without stating what should be and what is growing
(and Shonfield provides neither priorities nor specifics) is, of course,
impossible. How can one be sure that the experts are not planning the
equivalent of a two ton bumblebee? Moreover, any intervention by
central authorities to boost demand for future "essentials" necessarily
involves the cost of avoiding the current consumption of things which
people would otherwise prefer to have. And even if consumers prefer
more goods in the future to more now, a central question remains - can
the benefits of publicly controlled investment be evaluated without
exposing and evaluating the alternative investments which are fore-
closed from the "planees"?
If Modem Capitalism is to deserve a welcome in countries which are
concerned with individual welfare, it should be required to meet more
than some unspecified "growth" test. In modem society technological
advance has created innumerable things which can be produced in
proportions varying almost beyond comprehension. No planning board
could conceivably arrange the priorities among these output combi-
nations even with the most miraculous of electronic aids. Mere con-
temptuousness for competitive market forces as means of determining
appropriate output composition and resource allocation is scarcely a
substitute for careful analysis of the "growth" tasks or the even more
important "nongrowth" tasks of an economic system.
Where unacceptable private power is a concomitant of efficiency, or
where market transactions spill substantial adverse or beneficial effects
on nonparticipants, a "changing balance of public and private power" is
rather generally conceded to be appropriate. These particular problems
of economy of scale and social cost are not, however, exceptional prob-
lems which Shonfield would solve by central direction of investment
spending. For Shonfield private competition is an inefficient resource
bungler worse than private monopoly. Consequently, he considers power
dispersion no substitute for countervailing power or central control. It
therefore follows for him that diluting private power by providing com-
petitive rules or by expanding common market areas or increasing inter-
national trade is not an effective substitute for economic rationing by
experts. The dispersion of private power makes planning incomparably
more difficult; it is a planning inhibitor. Shonfield stresses the advan-
tages of international trade and also the advantages of central planning
by national units. He should face up to the dilemma presented by their
incompatibility.
It is submitted that true prosperity is to be measured in terms of the
kinds of things people choose voluntarily. (And the realm of choice in-
dudes choice between goods or services and leisure, and between goods
or services now and goods or services later.) Scarce economic re-
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sources are not necessarily better allocated by deciding arbitrarily that
tomorrow is more important than today. Neither is there unqualified
merit in full employment if people are to be employed in hanging up
each others' coats. Nor is there any obvious superiority in getting some-
thing more steadily if it means getting not quite what is wanted. But
more than economics is at stake. As Shonfield recognizes in a final
chapter, there are serious political implications to active government.
He suggests that a possible solution is confronting administrative ex-
perts with countervailing legislative experts representing special in-
terest groups. The problem needs probing much more deeply. Those
who take problems of civil and political liberties seriously are not likely
to find this final chapter a source of reassurance. Especially is this so if
Modern Capitalism occasions the rereading of Friedrich Hayek's The
Road to Serfdom or John Jewkes's Ordeal by Planning.
- WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.*
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